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Introduction 
 
One year after the collapse of Lehman Brothers and three years after the start of the food and 
commodities crisis, time seems ripe to make a provisional assessment of the resilience of the 
open trade policies to this severe downturn, and to draw the main lessons. 
 
In attempting to answer this question, we need to make a distinction between the “world trade 
regime” and the World Trade Organization (WTO).  The former consists in all the multilateral, 
plurilateral and unilateral trade policies.  Sometimes such policies amplify WTO weaknesses.  
But, sometimes they amplify WTO disciplines, as during the past year (see section 1).  The 
WTO, with its key disciplines and its dispute settlement mechanism, is the undisputed legal 
skeleton of the world trade architecture.  But, it is in a great need to adjust to a faster-moving, 
often chaotic, world trade regime. 
 
The distinction between the WTO and the world trade regime is even more crucial since the 
designation of the G20 as the “premier forum” for the international economic cooperation 
between the largest world economies [Pittsburgh Summit communiqué].  Korea which holds 
the G20 Chair for 2010 (and Canada the host the G20 in Spring) will have the major task to 
develop this new architecture—weaving together the G20, the WTO and the other trade-
related international institutions. 
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The paper is organized as follows.  Section 1 argues that, during the last year, the world trade 
regime has shown an unexpected resilience to a economic downturn of a magnitude unknown 
before.  Section 2 explains why such a positive conclusion is not shared by all the observers.  
Section 3 suggests four concrete proposals that would improve the resilience of open trade 
policies, in particular during the perilous exit period of the current crisis.  Section 4 stresses 
the fact that any progress in the world trade architecture faces a political constraint which is 
likely to stay with us for a long time—the “iron law of thin majorities” (the vast majority of 
the governments of the largest economies depend from very thin majorities).  Section 5 
examines the balance to be struck between designing stricter international disciplines and 
building robust institutions when improving the long term resilience of the world trade regime 
to large scale crises.  Section 6 draws some conclusions for the Doha Round and the post-
Doha Agenda, emphasizing the key role of Korea and Canada in the G20 context, and the 
assets of these two countries when playing such a role. 
 
1.  The good news:  the (unexpected) resilience of the world open trade regime 
 
The section argues that the world trade system has shown an unexpected resilience to the tidal 
waves of the three last years [Messerlin 2009].  One year ago, most observers were expecting 
a massive surge of tariff increases from the roughly 20 largest developed, emerging and 
developing economies which are applying tariffs at a (much) lower level than their levels 
bound at the 1995 Uruguay Round (see Table 1, section B).  This surge did not happen, 
except in very few countries (Argentina, Indonesia).2 
 
Meanwhile, substantial liberalisation has been done.  Many barriers to exports have been 
reduced or eliminated (economic analysis shows that barriers to exports are barriers to 
imports).  Despite a severe downturn, a key emerging economy (Mexico) has launched a 
swiping unilateral liberalisation with respect to the world, completing the preferential trade 
agreements that Mexico has already with the U.S. and the EC. 
 
It is thus too early to “cry wolf”—such a resilience of the open trade regime is good news.  
But it is also much too early to declare victory for several reasons. 
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First, this unexpected resilience comes from the world trade regime (the practices), not from 
the WTO.  Countries with “tariff water” (bound tariffs higher than applied tariffs) did not 
align their bound tariffs to their applied tariffs at the WTO—this remains a key issue of the 
Doha negotiations (see section 6).  However, the fact that the trade policies of the largest 
economies are de facto enforcing the key WTO notion of “value of binding” (no gap between 
applied and bound tariffs) is a promising sign in the long term.  And, it may significantly 
change the dynamics of the Doha negotiations in the short term (see section 6). 
 
Second, key emerging and developing economies have faced a domestic downturn (much) 
less dramatic than the downturn faced by the developed economies, or they seem to rebounce 
more rapidly (see Table 1).  In other words, their virtue has not been tested as harshly than the 
virtue of the industrial countries.  For instance, China and India are exhibiting growth rates of 
7.9 and 6.1 percent respectively (second quarter 2009, percentage change on year ago) [The 
Economist September 25, 2009].  These growth rates are (much) higher than those that the 
U.S. was enjoying during the “golden” 1990s and 2000s, and three to four times the EC 
growth rates of these decades. 
 
Third, developed countries continue to show negative or very low growth rates, while they 
may have exhausted the leverage of macroeconomic policies [Eichengreen and Irwin 2009].  
In such a context, recent trade barriers, such as the U.S. 35 percent import duties on tires from 
China adopted under the transitional product-specific safeguard (TPS) included in China’s 
WTO protocol accession, are worrisome for two reasons.  First, they may open the gate to 
new cases (shoes?) in the U.S. since it is much easier to impose measures under the TPS than 
under other WTO safeguards.3  The TPS provision is scheduled to be eliminated in 2014, 
hence will be enforceable for the whole duration of the crisis in the U.S. (see section 4).  
Second, the “trade-diversion” TPS provision means that, as soon as one WTO Member takes 
a TPS measure, other Members could enforce similar measures at almost no cost in terms of 
investigation, prior notification, input from Chinese parties, etc.  As a result, it may be 
ultimately much more difficult than expected for Chinese firms to shift exports to non-U.S. 
markets—fuelling frustrations in future G20 Summits. 
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Table 1.  Tariff water and the recent downturn 
GDP GDP
WTO average growth growth
Members bound applied tariff rate rate
tariff (%) tariff (%) water [a] [b] [c]
Section A. The 8 largest WTO Members without "tariff water" [a]
EU27 [d] 3.9 3.8 0.1 -4,7 -0,5
United States 3.3 3.2 0.1 -3,9 -0,7
Japan 2.4 2.6 -0,2 -6,4 3,7
China 9.1 9.1 0.0 7,9 --
Canada 5.3 3.7 1.6 -3,2 -3,4
Taiwan 4.8 4.6 0.2 -7,5 --
Hong Kong 0.0 0.0 0.0 -3,8 13,9
Macao 0.0 0.0 0.0 -- --
All Section A 4.1 3.9 0.3
Section B. The next 26 largest WTO Members with "tariff water" [a]
Brazil 30.8 12.5 18.3 -1,2 7,8
India 36.2 11.5 24.7 6,1 --
Korea 10.2 6.6 3.6 -2,5 11,0
Mexico 34.9 11.2 23.7 -10,3 -4,4
Australia 11.0 3.8 7.2 0,6 2,5
Turkey 16.9 4.8 12.1 -7,0 --
Indonesia 35.6 6.7 28.9 4,0 --
Norway 3.1 0.6 2.5 -4,8 -5,0
Saudi Arabia 10.5 4.7 5.8 4,5 --
South Africa 15.7 7.6 8.1 0,3 -3,0
Argentina 31.8 12.3 19.5 -0,8 1,1
Thailand 25.5 8.2 17.3 -4,9 9,6
Venezuela 33.6 12.7 20.9 -2,4 --
Malaysia 14.9 7.9 7.0 -3,9 --
Chile 25.0 6.0 19.0 -4,5 -1,4
Colombia 35.4 11.8 23.6 -0,6 2,7
Singapore 6.3 0.0 6.3 -3,5 20,7
Pakistan 54.6 13.8 40.8 2,0 --
Israel 11.5 5.0 6.5 0,1 1,0
Philippines 23.4 5.8 17.6 -- --
Nigeria 48.5 11.4 37.1 -- --
Egypt 27.7 9.2 18.5 4,2 --
NewZealand 10.6 3.2 7.4 -- --
Peru 30.0 9.7 20.3 -- --
Kuwait 100.0 4.7 95.3 -- --
Bangladesh 34.4 14.2 20.2 -- --
All Section B 27.6 7.9 19.7
Industrial tariffs
simple average
 
Source:  WTO Secretariat, Trade Profiles (April 2008). The Economist (September 26, 2009). 
Notes:  --:  information not available.  [a]  difference between the average bound tariff and the average applied 
tariff (average “tariff water”).  [b]  percentage change on year ago, second quarter 2009, except if specified.  [c] 
percentage change on previous quarter, annual rate.  [d]  for growth rate figures, eurozone. 
 
Last, the food and commodities crisis preceded the downturn crisis.  Protectionist measures 
adopted during the former crisis (export restrictions) have been eliminated during the latter.  
In other words, the liberalization undertaken during the downturn has notably consisted in 
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correcting the protectionist drift introduced only eighteen months before.  Such a swift shift 
offers the best ever illustration of the intertemporal inefficiency costs generated by the 
volatility of protectionist measures.  But, the ongoing crisis seems unlikely to end within the 
next two years, meaning that we will not benefit from such a happy turn of events soon. 
 
2.  The missing debate 
 
The positive view on the last year described above does not reflect a consensus.  For some 
observers, the slippage in protection is big enough to raise serious concerns [Evenett 2009] 
while other observers have significantly reduced their initial concerns—from a “significant 
slippage” [WTO Report March 2009] to “sand in the gears” [OECD-UNCTAD-WTO Report 
September 2009]. 
 
Why such a wide range of opinions?  Of course, it flows from the many intrinsic difficulties 
of an accurate monitoring of the ongoing changes.  Such difficulties begin with collecting the 
protectionist measures.  For instance, it is (much) harder to get the full range measures aiming 
at reducing domestic distortions (for instance, between large and small firms) than to collect 
tariff changes.  There are also methodological difficulties.  For instance, one would need to 
pay much more attention to the procedure consisting in systematically adding the count of 
measures at one point of time.  Such an addition ignores the fact that barriers are often 
substitutable, hence that one barrier works at one stage of the crisis while another one works 
at a later stage.  In such a case, counting two measures overstates the surge in protection—the 
proper count should be one measure at each stage (but the measure is different). 
 
That said, there is a more substantial reason for such a wide range of opinions.  It is that there 
has been no serious debate on the benchmark to be used for qualifying a possible “slippage” 
to protection. 
 
A first possible benchmark would be the complete absence of new protectionist measures.  
Supporters of such a choice invoke the Washington and London G20 communiqués which 
say:  “We [..] reaffirm our commitment to fight all forms of protectionism and to reach an 
ambitious and balanced conclusion to the Doha Development Round” [London Summit 
communiqué] (own emphasis). 
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Such a benchmark is clearly too stringent.  It is doubtful that it reflects the true state of minds 
of the G20 leaders who, as shrewd politicians, are well aware that they should be put some 
“oil in the gears” if they want to avoid serious political clashes at home. 
 
Such a benchmark is not even consistent with the traditional GATT-WTO approach which has 
recognized political constraints since the GATT birth, as best illustrated by Article XIX on 
safeguard or Article XVIIIB on balance of payment in the GATT text.  Finally, such a 
benchmark makes difficult to take fully into account liberalization measures, hence is at odd 
with economic analysis which gives to relative prices (prices of exports and imports) the key 
role. 
 
Another—better to our view—benchmark would be an indicator of the changes in trade 
barriers “routinely” implemented every year in the recent past, and to assess the extent to 
which changes in trade barriers occurring in the ongoing crisis have deviated from this 
“routine” indicator. 
 
An obvious first component of such a “routine” indicator is the sheer number of tariff 
increases and decreases.  A first attempt to provide such an estimate suggests a routine of 4 
percent of tariff line changes every year [Bouet and Laborde 2009].  This figure is high 
enough to suggest that what has happened during the last twelve months remains within the 
routine limits.  Of course, a similar information would be needed for all the other key barriers 
to trade.  It is relatively easy to gather for key barriers on imports, such as antidumping or 
safeguard measures [Bown 2009, van Grasstek 2009].  But, it is more difficult to collect a 
complete information on export restricting measures, and such an information is largely 
missing for “behind-the-border” barriers, such as subsidies or public procurement—to take 
two types of measures often used during the past year. 
 
3.  Proposals for improving resilience of open trade policies in the short term 
 
Crises are very sensitive to panics, and panics thrive on imperfect information.  The above 
discussion on benchmarks should thus not be seen as a discussion among trade specialists, but 
as a serious matter of public policy aiming at limiting the risks of panics and uncontrollable 
situations.  In this perspective, the above discussion sheds some light on what should be done 
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as soon as possible for keeping and improving the resilience observed during the last year.  
Two proposals seem natural candidates. 
• Proposal 1.  There should be a major effort to calculate the routine number of tariff 
changes during a representative sample of years (those under shiny growth and those 
under crises of various nature, magnitude and geographical scope) and of changes in 
other import barriers, such as antidumping, anti-subsidy, safeguards, etc. 
• Proposal 2.  A similar information should be made available, to the best possible 
extent, on changes in export barriers (export quotas, duties and credit regimes) and in 
key trade-distorting behind-the-border policies (public procurement, domestic 
production subsidies, technical barriers, etc.). 
Such indicators should be provided on a country and sector basis in a form easily usable by 
the ordinary citizens of the country.  Providing “user-friendly” indicators is essential for 
disciplining countries.  The international option of “shaming” countries adopting poorly 
conceived policies is often evoked.  But, the international trading community (starting by the 
WTO) would clearly hesitate to implement it on time for good or bad reasons.  By contrast, 
citizens of such countries may be eager to use such an information as rapidly as possible in 
order to get a better informed public debate on the policy of their own country. 
 
Proposals based on counting measures are clearly insufficient (they even could be misguiding 
in some cases, as argued below in the case of antidumping).  It is thus indispensable to get a 
“quick” economic assessment of the trade barriers introduced.  At a first glance, such a task 
seems so vast that it seems out of reach.  The situation is not so bad for two reasons. 
 
First, there is no reason to undertake such a task for the whole universe of trade barriers.  
There are only a few key barriers to monitor with special care because they are likely to be the 
first and/or most used components of a protectionist wave.  Best illustrations that come to the 
mind are antidumping, safeguards or production subsidies. 
 
Second, some crude criteria could be developed for a rapid assessment of the harmfulness of 
those instruments put under “special” scrutiny.  For instance, antidumping cases aim at 
fragmenting world markets and at establishing collusive markets that would normally be 
competitive.  Some new antidumping cases in products close to cases lodged during the last 
20 or 30 years may mostly aim at ensuring that the downturn will not induce firms to breach 
the existing collusive agreements—in short, that the cartel-like disciplines generated by the 
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previous antidumping measures will not collapse.  They simply reveal the true practices that 
were going on, quietly and behind the scene, before the crisis.  The extent to which such 
“new” antidumping cases deteriorate notably the situation existing in such markets is thus 
questionable—this is a case where a mere counting could create devastating panics under the 
form of a race to antidumping actions.  The truly worrisome sign of increased protection 
would be a spreading of antidumping cases to goods never involved in past antidumping 
complaints.  Only, such cases would deserve “special” scrutiny. 
 
This discussion suggests then two more proposals. 
• Proposal 3.  Establish a list of crucial trade barriers—those which have the highest 
likelihood to generate wide (for instance, recent safeguard measures tend to have a 
large product coverage) and/or long term (for instance, antidumping measures tend to 
last long, once adopted) distortions for the ongoing crisis. 
• Proposal 4.  Develop crude but fast techniques aiming to split the trade barriers under 
monitoring into those expanding protection and collusive behavior into new products 
and those “merely” re-enforcing existing protection and collusion. 
The list of trade barriers to put under special scrutiny cannot be decided once for all because 
trade barriers are substitutable to each other to some extent.  Hence, such a list may evolve 
over time, even during the same crisis.  For instance, at the beginning of the current crisis, 
many observers believed that tariff increases were the indicator to scrutinize carefully.  But, 
subsidies and public procurement have played a much bigger role in spreading the impression 
of a surge in protection.  Such a role may vanish in the coming years—subsidies may be much 
less fashionable when the Treasuries will face increasing budgetary constraints. 
 
The tasks required by these four proposals require skills and means that are not available in 
one international institution.  For tariffs and import quotas, the WTO has clearly the expertise 
and access to information needed.  It may also be the case for export quotas and duties, if the 
practice and/or legal language of the WTO concerning these instruments is beefed up.  But the 
WTO has no expertise in export credit regimes, in export or production subsidies and in 
public procurement, contrary to the World Bank, the OECD, the Export-Import agencies 
(perhaps the Bank of International Settlements in the case of the financial sector) etc. 
 
This is where efficient post-Pittsburgh G20 Summits could change dramatically the situation.  
Before, there was no international institution capable to decide to undertake such tasks in an 
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efficient way.  As a result, no initiative was taken, or the most affordable initiatives were 
taken by several institutions generating useless duplications.  Since Pittsburgh, it is possible 
that the G20 (or some ad hoc G20 sub-committee) will take the decision, and assign the tasks 
among the various available international institutions based on their skills, capacities and 
access to information. 
 
4.  Facing the “iron law of thin majorities” 
 
Exit is often the most dangerous phase of a crisis because it is the time where the pains and 
gains accumulated during the recession are netted out, making fully visible the stark contrast 
between net losers and winners, hence generating long term bitterness.  Such a phase may be 
difficult even in countries where growth has been severely cut only for a few months.  The 
long term impact of brutal short term decelerations is hard to assess.  It could be substantial in 
economic terms.  One key lesson from the Japanese Lost Decade [Kaji 2009] is that a great 
crisis generates relatively rapidly a severe attrition of competition in certain markets of goods 
and services, as it may already be the case in financial services.  The long term impact of 
brutal short term decelerations could also be substantial in political terms.  Bitter memories of 
what happened may fuel a loss of confidence in markets efficiency, generating a political 
establishment warier about open trade, and more generally, markets. 
 
As of today, macroeconomic analysts expect that the U.S.—the largest badly hit economy—
will be back on its “potential GDP” growth path in a few years from now—around 2014 
[Pisani 2009].  If correct, this simulation implies that all the next key elections in the largest 
industrial democracies (French and U.S. Presidents, French, German, Japanese and U.S. 
Parliaments) will occur before the final end of the recovery—hence possibly under still 
serious political stress.  The exact intensity of such a stress will depend of the path of the 
recovery:  would it be V-, U- or W-shaped?  The most frequent scenario seems a W-shaped 
curve (a recovery followed by a smaller downturn, before the final recovery) which could be 
very stressing from a political point of view because its double-dip could damage once again 
the return to confidence. 
 
This scenario deserves a important remark.  It takes the pre-crisis situation as the benchmark.  
Strictly speaking, this is not correct because the potential GDP path before the crisis was 
“doped” by the financial excesses of the late 1990s and 2000s, compared to what would have 
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occurred in a “normal” world.  However, calculating a “financial excesses-adjusted” potential 
GDP path is far beyond our capacities, meaning that we have to live with this error as an 
unavoidable additional cost of the excesses of the last decade or so. 
 
The same observation should be made from a trade policy perspective.  The financial excesses 
of the 1990s have generated huge distortions in markets, inflating some sectors at the expense 
of the others.  During these years, few observers were paying attention to such distortions, and 
to their discriminatory impact on trade flows.  For instance, exports of SUVs expanded at the 
detriment of exports of smaller cars, making some countries more successful (and others less 
successful) that they should have been with prices and incomes less doped by financial 
excesses.  Unfortunately, as in macroeconomic matters, it seems impossible to create the 
“counterfactual” of financial excesses-free economies.  But, at least, trade analysts should be 
very careful when evoking today trade-related discrimination based on the situation prevailing 
a year ago.  For instance, the strong decline of the demand for large cars since late 2008 is not 
(entirely) discriminatory—it simply reflects a move towards a more healthy situation which 
should have prevailed years ago.  This point is important to keep in mind if only because the 
carmakers of large cars will certainly argue that the recent evolution is entirely discriminatory, 
hence possibly ask for countervailing protectionist measures. 
 
That said, waiting for 2014 for the return to normality makes the “iron law of thin majorities” 
a tough constraint.  This law reflects the observed fact that, since the late 1980s, all the 
industrial democracies happen to share the same political trend—increasingly thin majorities 
support the elected governments, independently from the political color [Messerlin 2007].  
Whatever the reasons for such a similar evolution are, the final result is that narrowly elected 
governments are very likely to be weaker for resisting to lobbies than they used to be before 
the 1990s. 
 
The “iron law” has two dimensions.  First, increasingly tiny lobbies may succeed where they 
would have failed twenty years ago, a possible explanation of the difficulties to get a success 
in the Doha Round in July 2008.  Second, the length of time during which governments could 
successfully resist to pressure groups may be shorter—a dimension very relevant for the topic 
of this paper since it endangers the long term resilience of trade policies to large scale crises. 
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That said, two lessons could be drawn from the “iron law”.  First, waiting for “better” times 
(stronger majorities) may be illusory.  For instance, the current U.S. Congress may be hostile 
to or uninterested in trade issues.  But, if the “iron law” continues to be verified, hoping that 
the 2012 U.S. elections could change the situation is illusory because they will deliver another 
tiny majority, hence only slightly less hostile to or uninterested in trade matters.  In short, 
procrastination is not an option—a key point to keep in mind when looking at the G20 role. 
 
The second lesson to be drawn from the “iron law of thin majorities” is that one should be 
very careful when designing medium or long run initiatives.  There is a need to choose 
initiatives that require the lowest amount of political capital, since such a capital is limited.  
Of course, such a conclusion applies to initiatives to be tabled at the G20, as well as to those 
to be tabled in the WTO or in other trade-related international forum.  In short, agility and 
flexibility should drive the initiatives to be taken. 
 
5.  Stricter international disciplines and robust domestic institutions:  a key balance 
 
The section examines the initiatives which would have the best chance to enhance the long 
run resilience of the world trade regime to large scale economic crises.  It starts from the 
observation that there is currently a tendency to over-invest in stricter international disciplines 
and to under-invest in robust domestic institutions that appear critical for an effective 
enforcement of strict international disciplines.  Indeed, the current crisis provides some 
evidence that large scale economic crises can easily circumvent or wipe out international 
disciplines conceived during a quieter period (often many years before the burst of the crisis) 
and that international institutions are robust only as long as they can rely on the support of 
robust domestic institutions. 
 
The section assumes that large scale economic crises are not frequent (say, they occur every 
two to three decades).  This assumption is important because it gives a time span long enough 
to find the best balance between designing stricter disciplines (there will be enough time to 
agree on disciplines more substantive than those existing today) and building robust domestic 
institutions (there will be enough time to design them and they will have enough time to 
establish their reputation). 
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Designing stricter disciplines 
 
The current crisis has witnessed the proposal of many stricter disciplines to be implemented in 
case of large scale economic crises.  For instance, Dhar and alii [2009] have tabled a protocol 
organized in five sections (general principles, non-discrimination, standstill, subsidies and 
technical barriers to trade) and laying out 28 specific commitments.  These commitments 
would be signed only by the G20 members (though non-G20 members could join them) and 
they would be “exceptional” to the extent that they would lapse after a pre-determined amount 
of years (for instance, two years). 
 
Subsidies offer a good example for discussing such proposals.  Since mid-2008, industrial 
countries and the richest emerging economies have granted huge subsidies to the banking and 
car sectors.  The recent evolution of these subsidies is unclear.  While some banks are 
speeding up the reimbursement of the subsidies they received, a notable share of subsidies 
(public guarantees to banks, production subsidies to carmakers) is currently being extended to 
next year, despite increasingly distressed public budgets.  As all the subsidizing countries are 
signatories of the Subsidy and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement of the Uruguay 
Round, would that mean that a stricter SCM WTO Agreement should be negotiated? 
 
The current situation in the EC offers a compelling illustration that a stricter SCM Agreement 
is far to be sufficient.  The EC has a system of notifications, transparency and standstill 
disciplines for subsidies that is so precise and binding, and so strongly linked to the core 
competition provisions of the Treaty establishing the EC, that it is hard to believe that a 
similar agreement could ever be achieved at the world level during the next thirty years.  
Despite such a legal arsenal, EC anti-subsidy disciplines have been extremely disappointing 
during the past year.  Subsidies to carmakers and banks were routinely notified by the EC 
Member States (ECMS).  But, there is no clear indication that, during the examination of the 
notified subsidies by the Commission, significant changes have been requested by the 
Commission and introduced in the initial packages tabled by the ECMS.  And, the whole 
mechanism ended up in a blanket acceptance by the European Commission of almost all the 
notified subsidies.  It is only very recently that the Competition Commissioner (whose five-
year term ends in a month or so) begun to show some willingness to block mergers and to 
require rescued banks to restructure [International Herald Tribune 17 October 2009]. 
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How can we explain that the well-oiled (relatively successful before the ongoing crisis) EC 
anti-subsidy mechanism did not “bite”?  A first possible explanation is that these subsidies are 
ultimately not so discriminatory, hence inducing the Commission to estimate that the political 
costs of fighting subsidies would exceed the economic benefits of eliminating them. 
 
There may be some truth in this argument.  For instance, late 2008, all the ECMS producing 
cars have granted subsidies for scrapping old cars (“cash for clunkers”) [WTO Report 2009].  
If such subsidies were officially granted for greening the stock of cars in the ECMS, they 
were above all adopted for boosting the sales of new cars.4  Available evidence on recent car 
registrations does not suggest strong distortionary effects within the car sector (especially if 
one takes into account how tricky it is to assess “true” discrimination after years of financial 
excesses, as discussed above).  For instance, the shares of domestically-made and foreign-
made cars sold in the French market are relatively similar in 2008 and 2009 for relatively 
similar brands (see Table 2).5 
 
Such an explanation has serious limits.  First, even if subsidies to greener cars do not 
introduce a massive discrimination in the car markets, they definitively distort the demand of 
cars relative to the demand of other goods and services—the global demand of cars has been 
achieved at the detriment of current or future demand of other goods and services.  Second, it 
is doubtful that long lasting subsidies would not have some discriminatory impact in the long 
term. 
 
For these reasons, one would have expected that the Commission would have—at least—
paved the way for a progressive removal of the subsidies in such key sectors.  For instance, it 
could have tabled guidelines—following a tradition dating back from the 1970s and 1980s 
marked by the huge excess capacities in steel or shipbuilding.  The very long silence of the 
Commission raises serious questions about the robustness of international institutions which 
would be in charge of implementing stricter disciplines at the world level. 
                                                 
4
 In fact, many clunkers are still running, including in their country of origin, because the subsidy schemes were 
often badly designed, as best illustrated by Germany. 
5
 Such an example is not unique.  For instance, the guarantee that ECMS have provided to the clients of 
domestic banks would have been distortionary if only one or few ECMS would have taken such a decision.  
During a couple of weeks, this has been the case, with the Irish government giving an increased guarantee to the 
clients of the Irish banks alone (indeed, it is one of the rare cases where the Commission played its watchdog 
role).  But this did not last long because all the ECMS adopted quickly roughly the same guarantees.  Within a 
few weeks, the distortionary effect was much reduced, while the level of ECMS guarantee to clients was much 
higher and more uniform—a fascinating case of regulatory competition with a race to the top. 
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Building robust national institutions 
 
How then to ensure an effective enforcement of stricter international disciplines during large-
scale economic crises?  The European case in subsidies is interesting because it shows that 
international institutions—even with executive power and a long record, such as the European 
Commission—are not sufficient. 
 
Table 2.  Registrations in the French car markets, 2008 and 2009 
Brands
Aug'08 Aug'09 09/08 (%) Aug'08 Aug'09
Renault 309461 306 985 -0,8 21,87 21,46
Peugeot 239414 238 217 -0,5 16,92 16,65
Citroen 197126 220 978 12,1 13,93 15,45
French brands 746001 766180 2,7 52,73 53,56
Volkswagen 94277 96 822 2,7 6,66 6,77
Ford 78184 82 953 6,1 5,53 5,80
Opel 65051 57 115 -12,2 4,60 3,99
Toyota 62763 54 227 -13,6 4,44 3,79
Fiat 51386 53 339 3,8 3,63 3,73
Dacia 28136 34 579 22,9 1,99 2,42
Mercedes 35638 33 785 -5,2 2,52 2,36
Audi 32185 33 311 3,5 2,27 2,33
BMW 34669 28 359 -18,2 2,45 1,98
Nissan 26939 26 373 -2,1 1,90 1,84
Seat 24332 25 768 5,9 1,72 1,80
Suzuki 17298 18 370 6,2 1,22 1,28
Hyundai 13557 14 886 9,8 0,96 1,04
Kia 11367 13 777 21,2 0,80 0,96
Skoda 12316 11 910 -3,3 0,87 0,83
Chevrolet 5912 11 748 98,7 0,42 0,82
Mini 13496 11 229 -16,8 0,95 0,79
Honda 8608 9 805 13,9 0,61 0,69
Mazda 9372 8 060 -14,0 0,66 0,56
Alfa Romeo 6533 7 814 19,6 0,46 0,55
Volvo 8180 7 591 -7,2 0,58 0,53
Smart 6045 5 211 -13,8 0,43 0,36
Lancia 3224 3 363 4,3 0,23 0,24
Porsche 1245 1 459 17,2 0,09 0,10
Mitsubishi 1930 1 347 -30,2 0,14 0,09
Land Rover 2308 1 334 -42,2 0,16 0,09
Daihatsu 1180 1 239 5,0 0,08 0,09
Lexus 1607 1 154 -28,2 0,11 0,08
Saab 2228 1 152 -48,3 0,16 0,08
Dodge 1808 1 038 -42,6 0,13 0,07
Subaru 733 973 32,7 0,05 0,07
Jeep 1792 835 -53,4 0,13 0,06
Jaguar 1207 812 -32,7 0,09 0,06
Chrysler 2008 801 -60,1 0,14 0,06
Ferrari 159 237 49,1 0,01 0,02
Maserati 176 178 1,1 0,01 0,01
Lada 124 28 -77,4 0,01 0,00
Cadillac 66 10 -84,8 0,00 0,00
Total 1414828 1 430 391 1,1 100,00 100,00
Registrations Market shares
 
Source : Comité des constructeurs français d’automobiles. 
 
 15 
Two reasons may explain the Commission’s inertia.  First is the Commission’s desire to 
behave as a government.  This is an unfortunate deviation from the Commission’s core 
mandate which is to “ensure that the provisions of this Treaty and the measures taken by the 
institutions pursuant thereto are applied, and formulate recommendations or deliver opinions 
on matters dealt with in this Treaty, if it expressly so provides or if the Commission considers 
it necessary” [Article 211 of the Treaty of Nice].6  Second, and more importantly, the 
Commission has no strong institutional support in the ECMS.  Such an absence of domestic 
support at the ECMS level makes politically almost impossible the launch of economically 
sound debates on subsidies in the ECMS concerned during difficult periods—preventing any 
action from the Commission. 
 
This discussion leaves two options.  First is to give up about any willingness to design stricter 
international disciplines and to rely, as today, on “light” disciplines with international 
institutions being merely the host of negotiations on cooperative solutions to reduce and 
eliminate discriminatory measures.  This “light” option requires a decision to launch 
negotiations and a assignment procedure (which institution will be asked to host the 
negotiations).  After the Pittsburgh Summit, the G20 is clearly the place where to take the 
decision to launch negotiations.  Then, the G20 could either directly assign an institution to do 
the task, or it could charge the WTO to be its “dispatching” (assigning) arm to the extent that 
the issues at stake are trade-related.  For instance, in the case of subsidies in the car sector, a 
candidate institution to host negotiations first on netting out subsidies, then on progressive 
cuts of the remaining subsidies would be the OECD Secretariat which was the forum for a 
similar exercise on subsidies in steel and shipbuilding during the 1970s and 1980s.  An 
alternative would be an ad hoc sub-committee set up by the G20. 
 
The second option would be to design stricter disciplines and to ensure that international 
institutions would be robust enough.  The European case suggests that this second condition 
requires the existence of robust domestic institutions which would buttress the international 
institutions in the front line. 
 
                                                 
6
 The Lisbon Treaty makes no mention to delivering opinions.  Article 9D1 simply states that “the Commission 
shall promote the general interest of the Union and take appropriate initiatives to that end” before listing its 
coordinating, executive and management functions. 
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Is there a blueprint for such domestic institutions?  The Australian Productivity Commission 
(APC) seems an attractive model.  Its mandate is to be an “independent research and advisory 
body on a range of economic, social and environmental issues affecting the welfare of 
Australians” [APC website].  This mandate looks promising for the same two reasons that 
make the European Commission a disappointing institution.  First, independence is ensured at 
the cost of no executive power (APC is an advisory body).  In other words, the APC is not 
absorbed by attending to the most urgent things first (behave as a government).  Of course, 
this independence comes at a cost:  the influence of an APC-type institution is not 
instantaneous.  Rather, it flows from its capacity, year after year, to deal with thorny issues, 
by collecting the appropriate information, providing sound economic analysis, and 
disseminating both via numerous hearings involving all parties—in short, from its capacity to 
build over the years a strong reputation to offer good solutions.  All these features make APC-
type institutions quite different from competition authorities.  Indeed, it is remarkable that no 
ECMS competition authority has raised a strong voice for disciplining the subsidies granted 
since mid-2008, and that Australia has a very active competition authority, besides the APC. 
 
The second key—by far, the most important—feature of the APC mandate mentioned above 
is that the APC goal is the “welfare of Australians” which includes producers, but also 
consumers and tax-payers, hence allowing the APC to take the widest possible economic 
perspectives.  Such a feature gives to APC-type domestic institutions two key additional 
virtues.  First, it makes them are very sensitive to the risk of attrition of competition in the 
markets of many goods and services often generated by deep crises (as amply shown by the 
Japanese Lost Decade).  Second, it may allow to rely on such institutions for taking some 
risks in the world trade regime and in the WTO—for instance, when opening or re-opening 
the thorny negotiations on rules on contingent protection (particularly, safeguards). 
 
To conclude, adopting stricter international disciplines with some chance to enforce them 
during harsh times requires building robust domestic institutions such as the APC.  It would 
be conceivable that each WTO Member would create its own APC.  But, that is not necessary.  
What counts for the resilience of the world trade regime is that the G20 Members would be 
equipped by such institutions (of course, this should not prevent smaller countries to create 
such an institution). 
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Conclusion.  The Doha Round, the post-Doha agenda and the G20 
 
The G20 Pittsburgh Summit sticks to the official line—“we will fight protectionism [and] we 
are committed to bringing the Doha Round to a successful conclusion in 2010.”  But the tone 
is definitively softer—there is no emphatic reference to fight “all forms” of protectionism.  
Such a language may hardly boost the already low moral of the trade negotiators in Geneva. 
 
Paradoxically, the current crisis may have made the Doha Round easier.  During the past year, 
the largest emerging economies have revealed their willingness and capacity not to increase 
their applied tariffs in difficult times—that is, not to use their WTO rights to increase applied 
tariffs up to their much higher bound tariffs. 
 
Such a revealed preference may change dramatically the background environment of the 
Doha negotiations.  It should induce the emerging economies to abandon their claim that they 
make huge concessions when cutting their bound tariffs (they are currently showing that they 
do that for their own good) hence to accept to limit their requests for exceptions to such cuts.  
Symmetrically, it should induce the developed countries to abandon their claim for “effective 
market access” (meaning cuts in the tariffs applied by the emerging economies) if they do not 
want a definitive collapse of the Doha Round—facing for ever the risk of high bound tariffs in 
the emerging economies and losing the huge opportunities in services liberalization.  In short, 
both camps have to take their responsibilities. 
 
In any event, concluding the Doha Round by 2010 remains a serious challenge.  Korea—the 
G20 Chair in 2010—and Canada (the host of the G20 Summit in Spring 2010) would thus 
have the critical role to generate momentum.  Such a goal would require the G20 to move on 
three fronts. 
 
Mobilize trade negotiators 
 
First, it would be important to mobilize trade negotiators’ energy on the proposals suggested 
in section 3—getting a better sense of the trade-related measures routinely taken during 
“normal” years and of the potential impact of the most dangerous forms of protection.  The 
exit phase of a large scale crisis is perilous, and it has the capacity to severely damage the 
resilience of trade policies.  Avoiding confusion—hence fears, the mother of all panics—in 
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the coming months requires a better assessment of the level of resilience achieved in the 
coming months and years. 
 
As of today, we do not have such benchmarks.  The WTO has the capacity to generate these 
benchmarks only for import barriers.  The G20 should thus designate the international 
institutions capable to provide the benchmarks for barriers on exports and for key “behind-
the-borders” barriers, such as public procurement, subsidies, etc.  Rather than designating 
directly the other institutions, the G20 could alternatively ask the WTO to “dispatch” the 
benchmarks to be done by other appropriate institutions (OECD, UNCTAD, World Bank, 
Export-import agencies, etc.). 
 
Mobilize the business community 
 
Second, it is important to mobilize the energy of the business community in favor of open 
markets.  In this respect, goods do not offer very attractive opportunities to the business 
community in the long run for several reasons.  Applied industrial tariffs in the 25 or so 
largest economies are already low or moderate.  Binding them and cutting the remaining tariff 
peaks will be the important goal to achieve with the Doha Round.  But, that also means that 
the gains from negotiations in manufacturing after a successful Doha Round will be largely 
limited to the small developing economies—a crucial result for these countries, but a point of 
marginal importance for the largest economies.  Tariffs in farm and food products will remain 
substantial in most countries after a successful Doha Round.  But there will be huge pressures 
coming from climate change, water scarcity and energy substitution to further liberalize 
agricultural trade, giving a new “raison d’être” to tariff cuts in agriculture—to be a key tool 
for fighting climate-driven hunger and avoiding water-driven conflicts. 
 
Services can attract the support of the business community much more than any other 
conceivable trade-related issue, such as intellectual property rights, norms, non-tariff barriers, 
public procurement, rules, etc.  They are the largest source of opportunities for firms for three 
reasons:  their sheer size (50 to 75 percent of countries GDP), their ubiquitous presence (even 
the manufacturing or agrobusiness firms have a significant share (often about 50 percent) of 
their turnover in services) and their high level of protection—services are on average twice 
more protected than goods [Shepherd and Miroudot 2009].  Services liberalization will 
translate these opportunities into vast gains for consumers all over the world. 
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As this stage, the Doha negotiators can do very little in services for two reasons.  They have 
imposed on themselves a sequencing of negotiations—getting results in agriculture and 
NAMA before starting to look at services—that shut themselves up.  More permanently, the 
huge and heterogeneous WTO membership is not well suited for negotiations in services that 
deal with regulations, hence are much more complex than negotiations on tariffs. 
 
As a result, there is no harm to start exploratory talks on services outside the WTO, before 
repatriating them in the WTO if they are promising [Messerlin and van der Marel 2009].  
Such talks should be limited to the largest economies (roughly ten, the EC being one)—a 
group small enough to keep negotiations manageable and large enough to cover more than 80 
percent of world production in services.  One first possibility would be that the two largest 
world economies, the U.S. and the EC, explore the option of bilateral talks on services in 
order to have a better idea of the expected gains for consumers and opportunities for services 
providers.  Such talks have interesting “dynamics”:  it would be relatively costless and highly 
beneficial to extend them to eight countries in order to cover more than 80 percent of world 
production in services.  Furthermore, extending Transatlantic talks to these eight countries 
would massively reduce the risk of trade distortions. 
 
The transatlantic option is not the only one available.  Alternatives could be a transpacific 
(APEC) dialog or an Eurasian dialog.  All these options are open because, once one of these 
dialogs is launched, the above-mentioned dynamic forces will induce the non-participating 
largest economies to join the talks because the EC, the U.S. and the group of the eight other 
countries have roughly the same share in most services, and no interest to be excluded from 
the exploratory talks.  
 
As all these ten economies are G20 members, the G20 is a natural place to facilitate such talks.  
The G20 could even set up an informal committee to start such talks right away at the G20 
level.  If promising, the results of these talks could (ideally should) be “repatriated” into the 
Doha negotiations and constitute the embryo of a Doha agreement in services, giving the 
Doha Round the critical boost that was missing in July 2008. 
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Mobilize robust domestic institutions 
 
The “iron law of thin majorities” is a permanent threat to the open world trade regime and to 
the WTO.  Such a challenge can be dealt with in two different, complementary ways. 
 
First, the WTO should be “flex-plined”, that is made as flexible as possible while keeping its 
full role as a rule- maker (non-discrimination) and -guardian (dispute-settlement) [Messerlin 
2007].  There are many possible sources of flexibility in the WTO.  The most important is 
undoubtedly a reinterpretation of the “Single Undertaking” notion (every WTO member shall 
sign all the agreements negotiated during a round).  Ten years later, such a strict interpretation 
is backfiring.  It has fuelled a process of systemic de facto evasion of the WTO negotiations, 
with wide groups of WTO Members getting exemptions from various obligations (“negative 
coalitions”) under the various pretexts that they are small or vulnerable, net food importers, 
recent WTO Members, etc.  The alternative interpretation would be to make the Single 
Undertaking enforceable at distant periods of time, not at every Round.  Within a period with 
no Single Undertaking, the negotiation process would allow members to “discriminate 
positively”, that is, to open their markets further by participating in plurilateral agreements 
without waiting for an agreement among all members. 
 
Indeed, the crisis and a successful Doha outcome exert convergent pressures for “flex-
plining” the WTO.  The WTO current business as the key negotiating forum on tariff cuts in 
goods will be much smaller—it is “death by success”.  The WTO is unlikely to be such a 
forum in services because of the complexity of services negotiations.  But, it will remain the 
ultimate world forum for binding market access in goods and in services if it is made more 
flexible (see above).  By contrast, the WTO may increase its role as “rule-maker/guardian” by 
improving its dispute settlement mechanism, and by becoming an effective monitor of the 
world trade regime, a “dispatcher” on behalf of the G20 of tasks to be done in trade matters by 
other international institutions, and a repository of stricter international disciplines. 
 
The second way to deal with the “iron law of thin majorities” would consist in a serious effort 
to strengthen the national foundations of the world trade regime and of the WTO.  GATT was 
a “light” body in terms of commitments and disciplines.  The WTO is more demanding to the 
point that many obligations are routinely ignored or botched by its Members, as illustrated by 
its many monitoring obligations rarely fulfilled on time—when fulfilled. 
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As a result, looking for stricter disciplines for facing future large scale economic crises could 
be a dangerous illusion.  It runs the high risks that the disciplines will not be enforced 
precisely when it will be time to use them.  What is needed are domestic institutions robust 
enough to invest their reputation in their own country in supporting the stricter disciplines 
desirable at the world level.  An illustration of such an institution is the Australian 
Productivity Commission, with its two main features—independence (requiring the absence 
of executive power and the focus on analyses, debates and persuasion) and a mandate 
focusing on the “welfare of all the people living in the country”.  Such institutions are also 
well equipped to make adequate impact assessments of future national laws and regulations—
a feature crucial when topics on the table of negotiations include services or norms. 
 
Final remarks:  the role of Korea and Canada in 2010 
 
The crisis has put the G20 at the heart of the world trade regime, but the page is still blank.  
Much will depend from the initiatives to be taken by Korea (the G20 Chair in 2010, the co-
host of the G20 Summit in June 2010 and the host of the G20 Summit in November 2010) and 
by Canada (the co-host of the G20 Summit in June 2010). 
 
Korea and Canada are well suited for the huge task waiting them.  They are enjoying a rapid 
recovery, are strong supporters of the world trade regime and of the WTO, and have the best 
records in terms of resilience of their trade policies among the G20 Members. 
 
Last but not least, both countries share a very precious advantage.  They are among the 10 
largest economies (counting the EC as one) but not among the “big elephants”.  This feature 
allows Korea and Canada to table bold proposals without attracting the suspicion that the 
same proposals would get if tabled by one of the “big elephants”.  The long history of the 
international trade negotiations shows how decisive bold initiatives taken by such countries 
can be. 
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